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The credit channel assigns banks a pivotal role in the transmission of monetary
policy, which stems from the notion that ¯nancial markets are characterized by
imperfections.1 Banks are special in extending credit to borrowers { that cannot
access other types of credit { because of their expertise in mitigating ¯nancial
frictions. If banks adjust their loan supply following a change in the stance of
monetary policy, this has a bearing on real activity, since some borrowers have to
rearrange their expenditure decisions.2
As Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Hubbard (1995) point out, the credit
channel is working in addition to the interest rate channel, according to which
monetary policy a®ects the level of investment and consumer spending by in-
ducing changes in the cost of capital and yield on savings. Although, the credit
channel and the interest rate channel diverge in assessing the relevance of ¯nancial
considerations, they are deemed complementary, with the implication that mon-
etary policy can be e®ective through these transmission channels simultaneously.
In the spirit of Bernanke and Blinder (1992), a number of studies based on
vectorautoregression (VAR) analysis have examined whether the credit channel
is operating alongside the interest rate channel by using aggregate data. Many
studies have shown that bank loans decline after a monetary policy shock, but
these ¯ndings are plagued by a severe identi¯cation problem, as it remains unclear
whether the drop is driven by loan supply or loan demand e®ects. While the
credit channel emphasizes a shift in loan supply, the interest rate channel stresses
a shift in loan demand, which stems from a policy{induced decline in real activity.
Distinguishing between these predictions is a di±cult task, as "it is not possible
using reduced{form estimates based on aggregate data alone, to identify whether
bank balance sheet contractions are caused by shifts in loan supply or loan demand"
(Cecchetti, 1995, p. 92).
In light of this ambiguity, several studies have explored heterogeneity across
agents by moving from aggregate data to disaggregated data. For the U.S., Gertler
and Gilchrist (1993), Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (1995) and Oliner and Rudebusch
(1995) use panel data of a large number of business ¯rms. From this research it
appears that ¯rms of di®erent size encounter di®erent ¯nancial constraints after
a monetary tightening. Kashyap and Stein (2000) investigate panel data at the
individual bank level. They observe that monetary policy particularly a®ects the
1See Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Cecchetti (1995) or Hubbard (1995) for a survey of the
credit channel of monetary policy transmission.
2This idea centers on the assumption that some borrowers { in particular small and medium{
sized ¯rms { cannot issue corporate bonds at reconcilable terms because of information problems
or high costs associated with launching debt securities. Banks as ¯nancial intermediaries special-
ize in gathering and distilling information, which enables them to make loans to these borrowers
at more favorable terms.
2lending behavior of small banks with less liquid balance sheets. Kishan and Opiela
(2000) report a similar ¯nding by approximating bank lending activities on the
basis of bank size and bank capital.
So far, much work on the credit channel in Germany { implemented by Barran,
Coudert, and Mojon (1997), De Bondt (2000), Ehrmann (2004), Ehrmann and
Worms (2004), HoltemÄ oller (2003), HÄ ulsewig, Winker, and Worms (2004), Kakes
and Sturm (2002), KÄ uppers (2001), Von Kalckreuth (2003) and Worms (2003)
{ has employed aggregate and disaggregated data but reported contrary results.
While some of these studies ¯nd evidence in support of the credit channel, others
conclude that the credit channel is ine®ective. The vagueness in the results re°ects
in part the di±culty in separating the loan supply e®ects from the loan demand
e®ects that follow a monetary contraction.
This paper addresses the credit channel in Germany by using aggregate data.
We present a stylized model of the banking ¯rm, which speci¯es the loan supply
decision of banks in light of uncertainty about the future course of monetary policy.
Applying a vector error correction model (VECM), we estimate the response of
bank loans to a monetary policy shock taking into account the reaction of the
output level and the loan rate. We use our model as a guide to characterize the
response of bank loans { i.e. to decompose the adjustment of bank loans into the
parts that can be attributed to loan supply and loan demand { by matching the
theoretical impulse responses with the empirical impulse responses to a monetary
policy shock. In this vein, the identi¯cation problem inherent in aggregate data
is explicitly addressed.3
Our ¯ndings suggest that the credit channel is operating alongside the interest
rate channel. Banks decrease their loan supply with an expected drop in their
credit margin after a monetary policy shock, while loan demand declines with
a drop in the output level and a rise in the loan rate. The decrease in loan
supply occurs instantly and bottoms out gradually. The decrease in loan demand
proceeds by degrees and continues persistently.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our
model of the banking ¯rm, which establishes the basis for our testing. Section 3
sets out the empirical results, which are derived by adopting a two{step proce-
dure. First, we estimate a VECM to generate impulse responses to a monetary
policy shock. Second, we estimate our model by using a limited distance estima-
tion, which matches the theoretical impulse responses with the empirical impulse
responses. Section 4 provides concluding remarks.
3To our knowledge separating loan supply e®ects from loan demand e®ects by matching
impulse responses has not yet been proposed in the literature.
32 A Model of the Banking Firm
We base our analysis of the credit channel on a stylized model of the banking
¯rm, in which banks decide on their loan supply when future monetary policy
is uncertain. The model refers to Cosimano (1988) and Sargent (1979). Similar
approaches have been developed by Bo¯nger (2001), Elyasiani, Kopecky, and van
Hoose (1995) and Mitusch and Nautz (2001).
2.1 Structure of the Model
Consider a banking system with many identical banks that act as price takers.
Banks grant loans to nonbanks (Lt), which they ¯nance with deposits (Dt) and
central bank credits (Bt) after subtracting required reserves (Rt). Each bank
takes the loan rate (rL
t ) and the deposit rate (rD
t ) as given. The central bank is
assumed to administer the policy rate (rM
t ) that determines the interest rate on
the interbank money market.4



















t+j = pro¯t at time t + j;
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t+j = net position on the interbank money market
at time t + j at rate r
M
t+j;
Ct+j = costs of evaluating and adjusting the stock
of loans at time t + j:
Note that equation (1) is de¯ned for j = 0;1;2;:::.
Bank pro¯t matches the di®erence between the revenues and costs in the credit
business. Besides interest costs, the bank faces costs associated with adjusting







where (a) is a positive constant. The costs of adjusting the loan portfolio can
be thought of as re°ecting the allocation of resources necessary to evaluate the
4Notice that throughout the paper we presume that monetary policy is implemented by the
central bank in the form of an interest rate targeting procedure.
4creditworthiness of customers and to monitor loans during the duration. If the
bank realizes a change in the size of its loan portfolio, this requires to reshu²e
the amount of resources devoted to these activities. Assume the banking sector
comprises (n) banks with identical cost functions.








where (Et) is the rational expectation operator conditioned on the information
set (It) disposable at time t, and (¯) is a discount factor (0 < ¯ < 1). Let the
information set (It) include the past values of all variables and the present values
of all interest rates, i.e. Et(xt+j) ´ E(xt+jjIt).










where minimum reserves (Ri
t+j) are determined by: Ri
t+j = dDi
t+j, with (d) denot-
ing the minimum reserve ratio (0 < d < 1). For a single bank the level of deposits
(Di
t+j) is assumed to be exogenously given (see e.g. Baltensperger (1980); Klein
(1971)). Depending on stochastic °ows, the bank adjusts its net position on the
interbank money market (Bi
t+j) to meet the balance sheet constraint.5 The de-
posit rate (rD
t+j) is presumed to adjust to the interbank money market rate (rM
t+j)
in consideration of the minimum reserve ratio due to arbitrage conditions (Freixas
and Rochet, 1997, p. 57).
2.2 Deriving Optimal Loan Supply
A single bank maximizes the expected present value of its pro¯t °ow by choosing
the optimal path of loans subject to the balance sheet constraint and conditional
on the set of available information.














t+j+s); j = 0;1;2;:::; (5)
which raises with an expected increase in the loan rate and falls with an expected
increase in the policy rate. If the cost of adjustment parameter for loans (a)
5Hence, for a single bank (Bi
t+j) can either be positive or negative depending on whether the
bank borrows or lends on net at the prevailing interbank money market rate.
6The procedure used for deriving optimal loan supply is taken from Sargent (1979). See
Appendix A for details.
5increases, this requires a higher expected credit margin in order to maintain a
speci¯c level of lending.













t+j = 0; (6)
which shows that the optimal loan level is characterized by the equation of the
spread between the loan rate and the policy rate and the marginal costs of eval-
uating and adjusting the loan portfolio. The ¯rst{order condition is valid for
j = 0;1;2;:::; when j = 0, the variables refer to the presently observed and
expected values.
2.3 Loan Market Repercussions
Our model incorporates the assumption of a single and homogeneous loan market.
Aggregate loan supply of the banking sector satis¯es (here, evaluated for j = 0):










which is the sum of the supplies of the (n) identical banks that refer to the
currently observed and expected values.
Aggregate loan demand is assumed to be given by:
Lt = b1yt ¡ b2r
L
t ; (8)
where (yt) is the output level and (b1) and (b2) are positive parameters.7 The
demand for loans raises with an increase in the output level and falls with an
increase in the loan rate. The parameters (b1) and (b2) denote the income elasticity
and the interest elasticity of aggregate loan demand.
The equilibrium in the loan market is characterized by the equilibrium loan
level and the equilibrium loan rate.8 The equilibrium loan volume that maximizes
the banks' present value is (for j = 0):






2 Et(B1yt+s ¡ r
M
t+s); (9)
where ¸1 and ¸2 are positive characteristic roots, with ¸1 < 1 < 1=¯ < ¸2,
and B1 = b1=b2. The equilibrium loan volume increases with an expected future
7Modelling loan demand in dependency of the output level and the loan rate is commonly
accepted. See Calza, Gartner, and Sousa (2003), HÄ ulsewig, Winker, and Worms (2004) or Kakes
(2000) { among others { for empirical support.
8Since the credit channel does not imply credit rationing, we assume { for the sake of sim-
plicity { that the loan market clears by price (see e.g. Gertler and Gilchrist (1993)).
6increase in the output level and decreases with an expected future increase in
the policy rate. Substituting the equilibrium loan level (9) into the loan demand
equation (8) yields the equilibrium loan rate:
r
L






2 Et(B1yt+s ¡ r
M
t+s); (10)
where B2 = 1=b2. The loan rate raises with an expected increase in policy rate
and falls with an expected increase in the output level.
2.4 Implications for Monetary Policy Transmission
Our stylized model implies that banks decide on their loan supply in light of
uncertainty about the future course of monetary policy. Loan supply by the banks
declines with an expected fall in the credit margin after a monetary tightening,
but since the adjustment in the loan level is sluggish, the e®ects of monetary
disturbances are only passed on gradually. Since this suggests that banks are
not neutral conveyors of monetary policy { as predicted by the credit channel {
this is equivalent to the notion that bank behavior can play a meaningful role
in the propagation of monetary policy actions. We explore this prediction in the
following section by assessing impulse responses to a monetary policy shock.
3 Empirical Results
As in Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2004), we estimate our model to evaluate the adjustment of bank loans to a mon-
etary policy shock by using a two{step procedure. In the ¯rst step, we estimate a
VECM to derive empirical impulse responses. In the second step, we estimate the
model by matching the theoretical impulse responses with the empirical impulse
responses. The reaction of loan supply and loan demand to a monetary policy
shock is determined on the basis of the estimated model parameters.
3.1 Empirical Impulse Responses
Following Johansen (1995) and Johansen and Juselius (1990), we employ a vector
error correction model (VECM) of the form:
¢Zt = ¦Zt¡1 +
n¡1 X
k=1
¡k¢Zt¡k + ©Dt + "t; (11)
where Zt is a vector of endogenous variables, which are integrated of order one,
i.e. I(1), Dt is a vector of constant terms and "t is a vector of error terms that





where GDP stands for real output, rM for the policy{controlled short{term rate,
LOANS for real aggregate bank loans and rL for the loan rate.9 Loan supply by the
banks should depend on the credit margin, i.e. the spread between rL and rM,
while loan demand should depend on real output and the loan rate. The sample
period starts in 1991Q1, after the German uni¯cation, and ends in 2003Q2.10 GDP
and LOANS are in logs and rM and rL are in decimals. The vector Dt contains
an unrestricted constant and centered seasonal dummies. The lag length is set to
n = 3, which ensures that the error terms are free of autocorrelation and normally
distributed.
Testing for cointegration, Table 1 reports the trace test statistic. Critical
values are taken from Mackinnon, Haug, and Michelis (1999), which have been
derived in response surface regressions based on simulation experiments. The
Table 1: Cointegration Test
Rank Trace Critical Values*
Statistic 95% Level
0 62.09 49.64
· 1 33.96 31.88
· 2 15.80 18.11
· 3 4.91 8.19
Notes: *Mackinnon, Haug, and Michelis (1999), Table 4, Case III.
outcome of the trace test suggests that two cointegration vectors span the coin-
tegration space. Table 2 documents multivariate test statistics, which show that
the model is statistically well{speci¯ed.
Based on the VECM speci¯cation with the two cointegration vectors, we gen-
erate impulse responses of the variables in Zt to a monetary policy shock, which
is identi¯ed by imposing a triangular orthogonalization. The ordering of the vari-
ables implies that an innovation in the short{term rate a®ects real output with
9See Appendix B for a description of the variables used in the analysis. The results of unit
root tests show that all variables are integrated of order one, i.e. I(1), which implies that the
cointegration approach should be applied. The unit root rests are not reported here but are
available from the authors upon request.
10Notice that the end of our sample period is determined by the switch to the new MFI
interest rate statistics of the European Central Bank (ECB), which entails a structural break in
the data. See Deutsche Bundesbank (2004) for details.
8Table 2: Tests for Misspeci¯cation
Test Statistic p-value
Autocorrelation: LM(1) Â2(16) = 15:76 0:47
LM(4) Â2(16) = 13:20 0:66
Normality: Â2(8) = 10:30 0:24
a lag of one quarter, while the loan volume and the loan rate are a®ected within
the same quarter. Figure 1 displays the impulse responses of the variables after
a monetary policy shock, which is re°ected by a one{standard{deviation shock
to the short{term rate. The simulation horizon covers 20 quarters. The solid
lines denote impulse responses. The dotted lines are 95% error bounds based on
asymptotic calculation.11
Following a monetary policy shock, bank loans decline gradually. This corrob-
orates the results of De Bondt (2000), HoltemÄ oller (2003) and HÄ ulsewig, Winker,
and Worms (2004), who investigate the response of aggregate bank lending in Ger-
many in a similar framework using monthly and quarterly data. The drop in bank
loans continues for around sixteen quarters until it breaks o®. The output level
rises in the ¯rst two quarters and then declines persistently.12 The loan rate and
the short{term rate increase for about four quarters and decrease afterwards. The
loan rate follows a similar pattern as the short-term rate, but generally remains
on a lower level.
As Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Cecchetti (1995) point out, the decline in
bank loans after a monetary tightening is consistent with the credit channel, but
since the adjustment can be interpreted as being induced by loan supply and loan
demand, clear predictions are di±cult to establish. For an insight, we estimate
our model in an attempt to reveal the reaction of loan supply and loan demand by
adopting a minimum distance estimation, which matches the theoretical impulse
responses with the empirical impulse responses to a monetary policy shock. Before
we present the results, we brie°y discuss the methodology applied.
11For each variable the horizontal axis shows the number of quarters after the monetary policy
shock has been initialized. The vertical axis measures the response of the relevant variables. In
case of LOANS and GDP a value of 0.001 corresponds to a 0.1 percent change of the baseline value,
while in case of the interest rates a value of 0.1 corresponds to a change of 10 basis points.
12The primary reaction of the output level after the monetary policy shock is surprising. The
shift in GDP { which is also documented for Germany by Ehrmann and Worms (2004) and Mojon
and Peersman (2003) { is possibly related to the structural distortions in the data that emerge
right after the German reuni¯cation.
9Figure 1: Empirical Impulse Responses
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The estimation of our model is based on the following state space representation:
A0Xt+1 = A1Xt + Àt+1; (12)
where Xt is the state vector, which is composed of a vector X1;t of backward{
looking variables and a vector X2;t of forward{looking variables, A0 and A1 are





























t = B1yt ¡ B2Lt (14)











t¡1 + ´t+1; (16)
where Ã ´ (¯ + na¡1B2 + 1), B1 = b1=b2 and B2 = 1=b2. The ¯rst two equations
are derived from the model and specify the evolution of the loan volume and the
loan rate.13 The last two equations characterize the development of the output
level and the short{term rate. The output level is assumed to depend on its own
lagged value and the lagged loan rate, while the short{term rate is supposed to
depend on its own lagged values. The monetary policy shock is re°ected by the
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13The identity of the equations (13) and (9) is shown in Appendix A.2.
11The closed loop dynamics of the model, which serves as a starting point to generate
impulse responses, are given by:
X1;t+1 = (A11 + A12C)X1;t + À1;t+1
X2;t = CX1;t; (17)
where A11 and A12 are sub{matrices of A = A
¡1
0 A1, which have been partitioned
conformably with X1;t and X2;t.14 Using the algorithms as described in SÄ oderlind
(1999), the matrix C is determined numerically.
For the matching of impulse responses, we estimate the set of parameters:
» ´ (b1;b2;na
¡1;±1;±2;°1;°2;°3);
by minimizing a measure of distance between the theoretical impulse responses
and the empirical impulse responses. The discount factor is calibrated to: ¯ =
0:99. The optimal estimator of » minimizes the corresponding distance measure









^ ª ¡ ª(»)
´
; (18)
where ^ ª denote the empirical impulse responses, ª(») describe the mapping from
» to the theoretical impulse responses and V is the weighting matrix with the
variances of ^ ª on the diagonal.15 The minimization of the distance implies that
those point estimates with a smaller standard deviation are given a higher priority.
3.3 Minimum Distance Estimation
In estimating our model, we aim at evaluating the adjustment of bank loans to a
monetary policy shock. Figure 2 displays the impulse responses together with the
error bounds. The theoretical responses conform quite closely with the empirical
responses and fall generally { except for the primary shift in GDP { within the
con¯dence interval. Following a monetary policy shock, bank loans decline by
degrees. The output level rises slightly and then falls. The loan rate and short{
term rate increase initially and decrease afterwards.
Table 3 summarizes the estimated set of parameters ^ » that minimize the dis-













since A0 is block diagonal with an identity matrix as
its upper left block and the lower block of the shock vector is zero.
15If » is normally distributed, then J has a Â2{distribution with N ¡ m degrees of freedom,
where N is the number of observations on the impulse responses and m is the number of
coe±cients (see e.g. Smets and Wouters (2002)).
12Figure 2: Theoretical Impulse Responses









RESP. OF GDP TO RM
Simulated GDP
Estimated GDP








RESP. OF LOANS TO RM
Simulated loan volume
Estimated loan volume











RESP. OF RM TO RM
Simulated money market rate
Estimated money market rate








RESP. OF RL TO RM
Simulated loan rate
Estimated loan rate
13Table 3: Parameter Estimates









Notes: The value function is 42.08 with a probability of 0.99. The probability is calculated by
using a Chi{Squared distribution with 72 degrees of freedom. The standard errors are calculated
as the square root of the diagonal elements of the inverted Hessian matrix resulting from the
optimization of the value function.
income elasticity b1 and the interest elasticity b2 are 2.19 and 0.014, which is in
line with other reported elasticities that range between 1.1{2.5 and 0.01{0.60 (see
e.g. Calza, Gartner, and Sousa (2003), Calza, Manrique, and Sousa (2003), Fase
(1995) HÄ ulsewig, Winker, and Worms (2004) and Kakes (2000)).16
Our model implies that the adjustment of bank loans is determined jointly by
the response of loan supply and loan demand to a monetary policy shock. Recall
that loan supply depends on the expected credit margin:




while loan demand depends on the output level and the loan rate:
Lt = b1yt ¡ b2rL
t .
Figure 3 displays the development of the components that drive loan supply and
loan demand, which are calculated on the basis of the estimated and calibrated
model parameters.17
16The divergence in the estimated elasticities of loan demand might result from using di®erent
types of loan aggregates, in particular di®erent categories and di®erent maturities, which implies
that it might be di±cult to ¯nd a robust benchmark within these ranges. According to Calza,
Gartner, and Sousa (2003), a possible explanation for an income elasticity above unity is that
GDP might capture the e®ect of omitted variables, such as wealth, which are also relevant to
explain loan demand.
17Since the simulation horizon covers 20 quarters, we set T = 20 for the calculation of the
expected credit margin.
14Figure 3: Loan Supply and Loan Demand Components




















The ¯ndings suggest that loan supply by the banks declines with an expected
fall in the credit margin after a monetary policy shock. The drop in the credit
margin occurs instantly and bottoms out gradually. Loan demand declines with
the decrease in the output level and the increase in the loan rate. The fall proceeds
promptly despite the primary shift in the output level that is surpassed by the
primary shift in the loan rate.
In conclusion, our ¯ndings imply that the adjustment of bank loans is charac-
terized by the mutual drop in loan supply and loan demand following a monetary
contraction. The decrease in loan supply emerges instantly and fades gradually,
while the decrease in loan demand proceeds by degrees and lasts persistently.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper has addressed the credit channel in Germany by using aggregate data.
We have developed a stylized model of the banking ¯rm in which banks decide
on their loan supply in light of uncertainty about the future course of monetary
policy. We have estimated the response of bank loans to a monetary policy shock
taking into account the reaction of the output level and the loan rate. Using our
model as a guide, we have evaluated the response of bank loans { i.e. disclosing the
parts that can be attributed to loan supply and loan demand { by matching the
theoretical impulse responses with the empirical impulse responses to a monetary
policy shock.
Our ¯ndings suggest that the credit channel in Germany is working alongside
15the interest rate channel, which is consistent with De Bondt (2000), HoltemÄ oller
(2003), HÄ ulsewig, Winker, and Worms (2004), KÄ uppers (2001), Kakes and Sturm
(2002) and Worms (2003), who draw similar conclusions. Our results imply that
loan supply by the banks declines with an expected fall in the credit margin after
a monetary policy shock, while loan demand drops with a fall in the output level
and a raise in the loan rate. The decrease in loan supply occurs promptly and
bottoms out gradually. The decrease in loan demand proceeds by degrees and
continues persistently.
Appendix
A A Stylized Model of the Banking Firm
This appendix provides the steps used to derive a single bank's optimal loan
supply and the loan market equilibrium. De¯ne the lag operator by H such that
HXt = Xt¡1.
A.1 Optimal Loan Supply of a Single Bank


































for (j = 0;1;2;:::). Using the procedure established by Sargent (1979, pp. 197{












for (j = 0;1;2;:::).
The forward solution to equation (A.3) may be found by recognizing that







Et+jXt+j+i, if » > 1 and fxtg is bounded
(Sargent, 1979, p. 173). Here, » = 1=¯ > 1 and xt+j = (rL
t+j ¡ rM
t+j) is bounded,
if the transversality condition is satis¯ed.





T g = 0, where T denotes the terminal period. According to Sargent (1979,
pp. 197{200 and 335{336), the transversality condition holds if it is assumed




























for (j = 0;1;2:::). Next, expand the information set from It+j to It+j+1 in (A.4),
which is the information the bank has when taking the decision on Lt+j+1, and















for (j = 0;1;2:::).
A.2 Loan Market Equilibrium
The loan market equilibrium is characterized by the equilibrium values of the loan
level and the loan rate.
The equilibrium loan level (9) can be derived by means of the following steps.
Multiplying equation (A.1) with n and setting j = 0 yields:






Next solve the demand for loans equation (8) for the loan rate:
r
L
t = B1yt ¡ B2Lt; (A.7)
where B1 = b1=b2 and B2 = 1=b2, and substitute rL
t into equation (A.6), to obtain:
¯EtLt+1 ¡ (¯ + na




















where Ã ´ (¯ +na¡1B2 +1). Now factor the left side of equation (A.9) using the











= (1 ¡ ¸1H)(1 ¡ ¸2H); (A.10)
17where ¸1 and ¸2 are positive characteristic roots, with ¸1 < 1 < 1=¯ < ¸2.
Substituting expression (A.10) into (A.9) and applying the forward solution
as in (A.4) yields:






2 Et(B1yt+s ¡ r
M
t+s): (A.11)
Equation (A.11) can be rewritten by expanding the information set from It to
It+1, which gives:






2 Et(B1yt+s ¡ r
M
t+s); (A.12)
after changing the index from t + 1 to t and recognizing that ¸1 = 1=(¯¸2).
The equilibrium loan rate (10) is found by inserting equation (A.12) into equa-
tion (A.7) and rearranging terms.
B Data Base
All the data used for the VECM analysis is taken from the German Bundesbank
(www.bundesbank.de) and the German Federal Statistical O±ce (www.destatis.de).
1. LOANS: Loans to domestic ¯rms and private households (all banks), season-
ally unadjusted. German Bundesbank: PQA350; de°ated with the Con-
sumer Price Index: UUFA01.
2. GDP: Real German GDP in prices from 1995, seasonally unadjusted. German
Federal Statistical O±ce.
3. Loan rate rL: Average of the rate on mortgage loans and the rates of cur-
rent account loans. German Bundesbank: SU0001, SU0004 and SU0049.
Converted into quarterly data.
4. Short{term interest rate rM: Three{month money market rate, Frank-
furt/Main, monthly averages, German Bundesbank: SU0107. Converted
into quarterly data.
Figure 4 displays the time series in levels and ¯rst di®erences.
18Figure 4: Time Series in Levels and First Di®erences
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